Central bank and finance ministry officials from around the world have yet to agree an analysis of the fundamental problems underlying the credit crisis, a confidential options paper from a recent top-level meeting suggests.
While officials attending the Financial Stability Forum gathering last weekend in Rome encouraged banks to improve disclosure and replenish capital, the confidential paper produced for the delegates makes clear that the FSF's secretariat is thinking previously unthinkable thoughts.
The FSF will deliver a report to the Group of Seven meeting in mid-April, signed off by central bankers and finance ministry officials. It is unlikely to include radical options in the paper, but the FSF secretariat is encouraging national officials to consider hypothetical responses if the credit crisis continues.
First comes a set of solutions if the problem is one of deep uncertainty over the valuation of asset-backed securities, which is causing mistrust among financial companies and a generalised loss of confidence. In this case, the FSF secretariat suggests the answer might lie in greater transparency over who owns the problem asset-backed securities and how they are valued, alongside a co-ordinated revelation of individual banks' exposures to subprime and other risks.
The FSF paper suggests simultaneous disclosure by the largest banks “to a common template”, including common valuation methodologies for on and off-balance sheet exposures.
The second set of policies addresses the view that market prices for asset-backed securities underprice the likely cash flows of these assets. This view is prevalent in Europe – particularly in the UK. With low market prices, mark-to-market accounting rules weaken banks' balance sheets, creating pressure to sell assets and send prices even lower.
The two sets of solutions suggest changes to accounting rules aimed at providing “breathing space through forbearance” and purchases of assets by the authorities to put a floor under prices.
In the former, the FSF secretariat notes the danger that “such measures could damage market confidence in balance sheet health”.
For the latter, public purchases of assets “above current market values but [at] a significant discount to intrinsic value”, has the risk that “setting the price . . . would involve a very difficult trade-off between paying a high enough price to repair the troubled firm's balance sheet and restrict- ing the cost to the public purse”.
The third set of options is all about banks' solvency. If banks have fundamentally bad assets on their books, the FSF discusses forcing them to raise capital; restricting dividend and bonus payments; the authorities buying equity in banks; and encouraging mergers between troubled and healthy banks. These policies would involve explicit taxpayer costs.
The problem for the FSF or any other international body examining the credit crisis is that a policy that might be right for Bear Stearns might not apply to UBS or Deutsche Bank. What might suit the UK does not necessarily help in Spain or Switzerland.
Reaching international agreement will be a long process of argument and compromise. A neat, co-ordinated plan still seems far from deliverable.
来自金融稳定论坛(Financial Stability Forum)的一份机密选项文件显示，世界各国的央行和财政部官员尚未对造成信贷危机的基本问题的分析达成共识。
虽然上周末在罗马召开的金融稳定论坛的与会官员鼓励银行改善信息披露和充盈资产，但为与会代表准备的这份机密文件表明，这次高层会议的秘书处正在思考从前不敢考虑的想法。
金融稳定论坛将于4月中旬向七国集团(G7)呈递一份由央行和财政部官员签署的报告。文件中不大可能包括激进的选项，但金融稳定论坛秘书处正鼓励各国官员考虑，假如信贷危机延续下去，他们可能做出的反应。
首先是一套解决方案——假定这个问题是资产抵押证券价值面临的深层不确定因素之一。这个问题正在造成金融机构之间的互不信任，以及人们普遍丧失信心。
金融稳定论坛秘书处提出，在这种情况下，答案或许应是提升问题资产支持证券持有人及证券价值评估的透明度，同时协同披露各家银行的次贷风险敞口及其他风险。
金融稳定论坛的文件建议大型银行“按照通用模板”同时进行披露，其中包括资产负债表内外风险敞口的通用估值方法。
其次是一套政策——解决资产支持证券市场价格定价低于这些资产可能的现金流的观点。此种观点在欧洲，特别是英国，占据了上风。由于市场价格较低，按市值计价的会计准则会削弱银行的资产负债状况，造成资产出售压力，令价格进一步走低。
这两套解决方案均要求，以“通过债务展期提供回旋空间”为目的改革会计准则，同时由政府收购资产，抑制价格的下跌。
对于第一套方案，金融稳定论坛秘书处指出，“这类措施可能损害市场对资产负债健康状况的信心”。
对于第二套方案，政府部门“以高于当前市场价值但明显低于内在价值”的价格购买资产，“在设定价格时……可能很难在两个因素中找到平衡：一方面要支付足够高的价格，以修补困境中公司的资产负债表，另一方面则要限制公共资金的使用成本。”
第三套选项完全关乎银行的偿付能力。假如银行账目中存在基本面不佳的资产，金融稳定论坛的建议是：强迫他们提高资本金；限制股息和奖金的派发；由政府出面购买银行的股本；鼓励困境中的银行与健康银行合并。这些将涉及的纳税人成本清晰可见。
金融稳定论坛和其他任何审视这场信贷危机的国际机构面临的问题是，对贝尔斯登(Bear Stearns)适用的政策或许并不适用于瑞银(UBS)或德意志银行(Deutsche Bank)。适合英国的做法，在西班牙或瑞士可能不一定管用。
达成国际协议将是一个漫长的争论和妥协过程。距离制订出完善的协同方案看来仍需很长一段时间。
