Glaring differences in the responsibilities and remuneration of central bankers raise serious questions about the accountability of those in charge of the world's financial systems, a report by a group of economists has warned.
Central banks have won independence in setting interest rates because of widespread agreement that freedom from political influence increases their effectiveness.
But the variety of other tasks given to monetary authorities and the “stunning” variation in pay suggests there is little agreement on best practice when it comes to central bankers' work, according to the report released by Sweden's Riksbank.
As well as setting interest rates, central banks act variously as lenders of last resort, insurers, regulators and sometimes even as competition authorities. But those roles can produce conflicts of interest – for instance, fears about bank stability might lead to lower interest rates than justified by the inflation outlook.
During the recent financial market turmoil, central bankers have not just set monetary policy but have also played a crucial role in ensuring financial market stability, write Lars Frisell and Kasper Roszbach at the Riksbank in Stockholm, and Giancarlo Spagnolo at the University of Rome Tor Vergata.
However, they argue that issues such as the financial incentives offered to central bank governors and board members and their multiple objectives “have been unsatisfactorily addressed by existing research”.
Among central banks surveyed, Norway's governor was paid just three times the country's gross national income per capita. But Hong Kong's received 47 times GNP per capita.
Among other differences identified are the ways in which central bank governors can be sacked.
The governor with the least job security, in theory, is Ben Bernanke, chairman of the US Federal Reserve, who can be dismissed by the US president “for any cause”.
At the other extreme is Jean-Claude Trichet, president of the European Central Bank, whose dismissal would require a court decision.
On pay, the report – which does not necessarily reflect the views of the Riksbank – identifies two broad approaches.
On the one hand, Mr Bernanke is relatively poorly paid – part of a US tradition of selecting people with a vocation for public service. But other countries appear to believe higher pay attracts higher-quality staff and reduces the temptation to seek alternative sources of income or corruption.
The ECB has this month taken a step towards greater transparency by releasing for the first time the salaries of Mr Trichet and his colleagues on its six-man executive board. Last year he was paid €345,252 ($530,000, £266,000).
几位经济学家的一份调查报告警告称，中央银行家在职责与薪酬方面存在巨大差异，这给全球金融系统掌控者的责任提出了严肃的问题。
在制定利率方面，各国央行获得了独立决策权，因为人们普遍认为，免受政治影响会提高央行的效率。
但瑞典央行(Swedish Riksbank)发布的这份报告称，货币当局承担的各种其它任务及薪酬方面的“惊人”差异表明，就中央银行家的工作而言，人们在什么是最佳做法上没有什么共识。
除了制定利率，央行还扮演着最后贷款人、承保人及监管者等不同角色，有时甚至还担任竞争监管机构。但这些角色可能会造成利益冲突——例如，由于担心银行的稳定性，可能导致央行并不根据通胀前景而采取降息举措。
斯德哥尔摩瑞典央行的拉斯•弗里塞尔(Lars Frisell)与卡斯波尔•罗兹巴赫(Kasper Roszbach)及罗马托威尔伽塔大学(University of Rome Tor Vergata)的杰安卡罗•斯巴诺罗(Giancarlo Spagnolo)在报告中写到，在近期金融市场动荡中，中央银行家不仅制定货币政策，而且还在确保金融市场稳定方面扮演了至关重要的角色。
但他们表示，一些问题“未能在现有的研究中得到满意地解决”，例如为央行行长与理事会成员提供的经济激励及他们的多重目标。
在参与调查的央行中，挪威央行行长的工资仅仅是该国人均国民总收入的3倍。但在香港，这个数字是当地人均国民生产总值(GNP)的47倍。
该报告所提到的其它不同之处，还包括央行行长的解职方式。
在理论上，工作最没有保障的是美联储(Fed)主席本•伯南克(Ben Bernanke)，美国总统可以“以任何理由”将其解职。
而另一个极端是欧洲央行(ECB)行长让-克劳德•特里谢(Jean-Claude Trichet)，他的解职需要法院判决才能生效。
在收入方面，该报告——不一定代表瑞典央行的观点——指出了两种大的方向。
一方面，伯南克的收入较低。美国的传统之一就是选择那些具有使命感的人来担任公职。但其它国家似乎认为，更高的薪酬会吸引更优秀的人才，并会减少通过其它途径获得收入或是收受贿赂的诱惑。
本月，欧洲央行又向着更大的透明度迈进了一步，首次公布了特里谢及其六名同事(执行理事会成员)的薪资。去年，他的收入为345252欧元(合53万美元)。
