莫为石油枯竭发愁

Many energy analysts view the ongoing waltz of crude prices with the mystical $100 mark -- notwithstanding the dollar's anemia -- as another sign of the beginning of the end for the oil era. '[A]t the furthest out, it will be a crisis in 2008 to 2012,' declares Matthew Simmons, the most vocal voice among the 'neo-peak-oil' club. Tempering this pessimism only slightly is the viewpoint gaining ground among many industry leaders, who argue that daily production by 2030 of 100 million barrels will be difficult.

In fact, we are nowhere close to reaching a peak in global oil supplies.

Given a set of assumptions, forecasting the peak-oil-point -- defined as the onset of global production decline -- is a relatively trivial problem. Four primary factors will pinpoint its exact timing. The trivial becomes far more complex because the four factors -- resources in place (how many barrels initially underground), recovery efficiency (what percentage is ultimately recoverable), rate of consumption, and state of depletion at peak (how empty is the global tank when decline kicks in) -- are inherently uncertain.

-- What are the global resources in place? Estimates vary. But approximately six to eight trillion barrels each for conventional and unconventional oil resources (shale oil, tar sands, extra heavy oil) represent probable figures -- inclusive of future discoveries. As a matter of context, the globe has consumed only one out of a grand total of 12 to 16 trillion barrels underground.

-- What percentage of global resources is ultimately recoverable? The industry recovers an average of only one out of three barrels of conventional resources underground and considerably less for the unconventional.

This benchmark, established over the past century, is poised to change upward. Modern science and unfolding technologies will, in all likelihood, double recovery efficiencies. Even a 10% gain in extraction efficiency on a global scale will unlock 1.2 to 1.6 trillion barrels of extra resources -- an additional 50-year supply at current consumption rates.

The impact of modern oil extraction techniques is already evident across the globe. Abqaiq and Ghawar, two of the flagship oil fields of Saudi Arabia, are well on their way to recover at least two out of three barrels underground -- in the process raising recovery expectations for the remainder of the Kingdom's oil assets, which account for one quarter of world reserves.

Are the lessons and successes of Ghawar transferable to the countless struggling fields around the world -- most conspicuously in Venezuela, Mexico, Iran or the former Soviet Union -- where irreversible declines in production are mistakenly accepted as the norm and in fact fuel the 'neo-peak-oil' alarmism? The answer is a definitive yes.

Hundred-dollar oil will provide a clear incentive for reinvigorating fields and unlocking extra barrels through the use of new technologies. The consequences for emerging oil-rich regions such as Iraq can be far more rewarding. By 2040 the country's production and reserves might potentially rival those of Saudi Arabia.

Paradoxically, high crude prices may temporarily mask the inefficiencies of others, which may still remain profitable despite continuing to use 1960-vintage production methods. But modernism will inevitably prevail: The national oil companies that hold over 90% of the earth's conventional oil endowment will be pressed to adopt new and better technologies.

-- What will be the average rate of crude consumption between now and peak oil? Current daily global consumption stands around 86 million barrels, with projected annual increases ranging from 0% to 2% depending on various economic outlooks. Thus average consumption levels ranging from 90 to 110 million barrels represent a reasonable bracket. Any economic slowdown -- as intimated by the recent tremors in the global equity markets -- will favor the lower end of this spectrum.

This is not to suggest that global supply capacity will grow steadily unimpeded by bottlenecks -- manpower, access, resource nationalism, legacy issues, logistical constraints, etc. -- within the energy equation. However, near-term obstacles do not determine the global supply ceiling at 2030 or 2050. Market forces, given the benefit of time and the burgeoning mobility of technology and innovation across borders, will tame transitional obstacles.

-- When will peak oil arrive? This widely accepted tipping point -- 50% of ultimately recoverable resources consumed -- is largely a tribute to King Hubbert, a distinguished Shell geologist who predicted the peak oil point for the U.S. lower 48 states. While his timing was very good (he forecast 1968 versus 1970 in fact), he underestimated peak daily production (9.5 million barrels actual versus eight million estimated).

But modern extraction methods will undoubtedly stretch Hubbert's '50% assumption,' which was based on Sputnik-era technologies. Even a modest shift -- to 55% of recoverable resources consumed -- will delay the onset by 20-25 years.

Where do reasonable assumptions surrounding peak oil lead us? My view, subjective and imprecise, points to a period between 2045 and 2067 as the most likely outcome.

Cambridge Energy Associates forecasts the global daily liquids production to rise to 115 million barrels by 2017 versus 86 million at present. Instead of a sharp peak per Hubbert's model, an undulating, multi-decade long plateau production era sets in -- i.e., no sudden-death ending.

The world is not running out of oil anytime soon. A gradual transitioning on the global scale away from a fossil-based energy system may in fact happen during the 21st century. The root causes, however, will most likely have less to do with lack of supplies and far more with superior alternatives. The overused observation that 'the Stone Age did not end due to a lack of stones' may in fact find its match.

The solutions to global energy needs require an intelligent integration of environmental, geopolitical and technical perspectives each with its own subsets of complexity. On one of these -- the oil supply component -- the news is positive. Sufficient liquid crude supplies do exist to sustain production rates at or near 100 million barrels per day almost to the end of this century.

Technology matters. The benefits of scientific advancement observable in the production of better mobile phones, TVs and life-extending pharmaceuticals will not, somehow, bypass the extraction of usable oil resources. To argue otherwise distracts from a focused debate on what the correct energy-policy priorities should be, both for the United States and the world community at large.

(Editor's Note: Mr. Saleri, president and CEO of Quantum Reservoir Impact in Houston, was formerly head of reservoir management for Saudi Aramco.)

这些天，原油价格轻松越过了100美元大关，虽然这里有美元走软的因素在起作用，但许多能源分析师仍将此视为石油时代开始走向终结的又一迹象。在这个“石油产量触顶论”俱乐部里叫得最响的是马修•西蒙斯(Matthew Simmons)。他说，按最坏的估计，2008-2012年期间甚至有可能爆发危机。众多业界领袖中有越来越多的人相信，到2030年之前全球石油日产量达到1亿桶会有难度，这种观点或多或少加剧了触顶派们的悲观论调。

实际上，在全球石油供应方面我们目前还远远谈不上接近顶峰。

鉴于人们给出的一系列假定，预测石油产量达到顶峰（也就是全球石油产量下滑的拐点）的时间点本身相对来说反而不那么重要了。决定这个时点何时到来的有四大基本因素，分别是资源储量（有多少待开采的储量）、采收率（储量中最终能被开采出来的比例）、石油消耗速度和顶峰时的损耗程度（开始下降时全球储量被消耗的情况）。

因为这四个因素的存在，及其内在不确定性，使得预测石油产量的见顶时间变得更加复杂。现在便让我们对这四个因素逐一解读。

首先，目前全球石油储量究竟怎样？在这个问题上，人们的估计各不相同，但大体来说，常规石油和非常规石油(包括页岩油、油砂、超稠油)储量可能分别都在6-8万亿桶左右。这个估计数字包括今后可能发现的储量。值得关注的是，地下未开采的储量总计有12万亿至16万亿桶，而目前全球已经消耗的储量只不过1万亿桶。

采收率能达到什么水平？目前，常规石油的采收率在三分之一左右，非常规石油的采收率要低得多。

广告这个比例是经过去100年的发展达到的水平，相信今后会有所提高。现代科学和开采技术的进步很有可能让上述比例提高一倍。即使只提高10%，也意味着能多开采1.2万亿至1.6万亿桶。如按目前的消耗水平计算，这个量已可满足地球50年的需求。

而现代开采技术的进步在全球范围都已非常显著。在储量占全球总储量四分之一的沙特阿拉伯，两大著名油田Abqaiq 和Ghawar目前的采收率有望至少达到三分之二的水平，人们由此期待，该国其他油田的采收水平也将提高。

Ghawar的经验是否能在世界上其他许多艰难维持的油田加以推广呢？答案是肯定的。在委内瑞拉、墨西哥、伊朗和前苏联，有一大批这样的油田，以致于让大家误认为产量无可挽回的下滑是正常现象，这也是导致一些人惊呼石油产量即将触顶的原因。

但百元高位的油价无疑会鼓励老油田的复兴，并依靠新技术开采出更多原油。这对伊拉克等新兴产油国的影响会更显著。到2040年，伊拉克的石油产量和储量有可能双双超过沙特。

但荒谬的是，高油价可能会暂时掩盖其他油田的低效率，这些油田即使仍沿用上世纪六十年代发明的老式开采方法仍有利可图。但现代化的潮流势不可挡，握有全球逾九成常规石油储量的各国有石油公司将不得不采用更新、更先进的技术。

在产量高峰到来前的这段时间，世界石油消耗的平均速度如何？目前的全球日消耗量大约是8,600万桶，对应不同的经济前景，每年的增幅应在0%-2%之间，这就意味着平均日消耗量介于9,000万至1亿桶之间。如果近期的全球证券市场动荡最终导致经济出现下滑，则实际消耗将更接近低端数字。

这并不是说全球的石油供应能力将平稳增长下去，不会受到诸如人力资源、市场准入、资源国家主义、历史遗留问题和物流方面限制条件等瓶颈因素的制约。不过，近期的各种障碍不会导致2030年或2050年全球供应达到顶峰。时代的发展和全球技术和创新领域焕发的活力将克服这些过渡性障碍的影响。

什么情况下可以视为产量高峰到来了呢？在这个问题上，人们普遍接受的一个临界点是可开采能源储量最终有50%被开采消耗掉。这一理论出自杰出的壳牌(Shell)地质学家金•休伯特(King Hubbert)。正是他预言了美国本土石油生产的高峰时点。他预测的时间是1968年，与实际发生的1970年非常接近，不过他对高峰日产量的预测值偏低了，实际是950万桶，他的预测是800万桶。

然而，现代开采技术无疑会将休伯特的“50%假定”拉长。他的那个假定是基于人造卫星时代的技术水平。而即使将50%的尺度稍微延长一点，比如说到55%，那么，高峰节点的到来就将推后20至25年。

基于以上各种合理假设，我们能得出怎样的结论呢？以我主观且不精确的估计，这个节点的到来最大可能会是在2045-2067年之间。

据剑桥能源学会(Cambridge Energy Associates)预测，到2017年，全球石油日消耗量将从目前的8,600万桶增加到1.15亿桶。休伯特理论认为的触顶然后一路下行的模型不会出现，石油生产将进入一个波浪式的、长达几十年的高位徘徊时期。

世界石油供应不会很快耗尽。全球范围从化石类能源向其他能源形式的逐渐过渡将在这个世纪发生。不过，这一过渡的根本原因很有可能与供应不足无关，而在很大程度上是因为人们有了更好的替代选择。有句话说，石器时代的结束并不是因为人们没有足够的石头了，虽说这话太老套，但在这里可能也适用。

找到满足全球能源需求的办法需要综合考虑环境、地缘政治和技术前景等多方面的因素。在石油供应本身这个要素上，目前的情况还是很乐观的。地球上有充足的原油供应，足以应付本世纪末之前全世界每天1亿桶的消耗量。

技术也是一大因素。当今，人类在手机、电视、长寿药物等方面都取得了显著的科学进步，石油开采方面也同样不会停滞不前。不要杞人忧天，这会妨碍世人专心讨论能源政策的优先着力点。